Options for Choosing a Civilian Review Board
Submitted to the Civilian Review Board subcommittee of the City of Austin Police Oversight Focus Group by Scott Henson, The Sunshine Project for Police Accountability, November 10, 1999
|
Method of Selection |
Political Influence |
Expertise |
Expense |
Benefits |
Detriments |
|
Appointed by the Mayor and City Council |
High |
Educated laypeople |
Low |
Simple, obvious precedent set by other council-appointed boards. |
Appointments are politicized; future councils may oppose police accountability and appoint bad CRB members.
|
|
Elections |
High |
Self-selected educated lay people |
High. Big picture includes both costs of holding the election and money going to campaigns.
|
Appearance of public approval for winners. |
Would require separate charter amendment which could not occur until May 2002. Also, APA would control elections over time.
|
|
Chosen from the municipal jury pool on a case by case basis |
None |
None -- expertise lies with staff, attorneys and hearings officers at an administrative hearing. |
Moderate -- infrastructure already funded and in place.
|
Only way to get disinterested, apolitical decisionmakers on the CRB. Expert staff ensures consistency.
|
Model's success relies heavily on the competence of the Auditor's staff. |
|
Chosen through community groups |
High |
Educated laypeople |
Moderate
|
Takes CRB appointments out of council and police control. |
Impossible to decide which groups get to do the picking.
|
|
Select CRB like a grand jury |
Moderate to High |
Laypeople |
Low to moderate |
Allows a more specific vehicle for soliciting community input than simply giving the decision to "community groups." CRB members may have greater expertise because they hear more than one case. |
More politicized, just as the grand jury selection is very politicized. Multiple case workload creates a substantial commitment for volunteers. |