"Cons" of the POFG Recommendations

Cons

  1. The POFG ignored almost completely any significant citizen input into their proposal, disdaining even to allow public comment on the final recommendations (as was promised) before sending them to the council. Prominent examples are:
    1. Citizen demands to open records to the same extent they are open at the Travis County Sheriff's Office were met with indifference and ultimately killed by APA representatives on the task force near the end of the process
    2. Citizens frequently demanded that any oversight board have subpoena power. This proposal does provide for that.
    3. Cases like that of Samuel Ramirez, the alleged rapist cop who Judge Meurer reinstated to the force based on the city's civil service obligations, caused many citizens to ask the POFG to recommend changes to ensure this wouldn't recur in the future. But the APA representatives from the beginning ruled out any changes to the disciplinary process after the chief's decision, i.e., in the appeals process. This was a devastating blow to real reform, because that's precisely the part of the process where bad cops routinely get reinstated to the force based on absurdities like the Ramirez loophole. APA representatives disingenuously claimed they didn't want the POFG recommendations to impinge on the power of the chief, but in reality the chief is truly powerless to fire bad officers because of the skewed appeals process that the APA considered a sacred cow. The City should insist that the Meet and Confer contract close this loophole.
    4. Citizens repeatedly demand that the board have real authority within the APD disciplinary process. But instead, it only makes recommendations.

  2. The Police Monitor's job is too broad, and too much for a four-person staff to accomplish.
    1. Suggestion: There's no need for the police monitor to chair the Oversight panel, as that's just one more thing on an already full plate.
    2. The proposed staff is to small to effectively handle and monitor the complaint process. Austin's police force and city are of similar size to San Jose where this model came from, but their police officers receive less than half the number of complaints annually as ours do. The volume may overwhelm them. Suggestion: Now that Chief Knee has created an officer-involved crimes unit, the IAD exclusively handles administrative complaints. These duties could be folded into APD human resources and personnel functions, and IAD's budget could be used to finance the civilian complaint processing system under the Police Monitor, possibly even moving the investigative function there to provide for less biased civilian investigators.

  3. Monitor qualifications presently only specify no prior employment with APD. The monitor should also never have been employed by the APA, or by any law enforcement agency.
  4. Board qualifications are too burdensome and are greater than other city boards and commissions, even those that possess more actual authority. The no felony conviction rule is asinine. Should Hollywood Henderson, for example, be excluded from such a board?
  5. "Independent Investigations: Though a good idea and a good precedent to set, in reality these will never happen because the chief or the city manager must sign off on them beforehand, and these are exactly the bureaucrats who have the most to lose from finding fault with officers' conduct. The city manager is far more worried about civil liability than justice for complainants.
  6. The open records policy envisioned under the proposed recommendations is little better than at present; only material given to the Oversight panel about cases complainants choose to appeal will be open. The Sunshine Project believes the M&C Agreement should establish an open records policy for APD at least as open as at the Travis County Sheriff's Department, which is governed by the Public Information Act instead of the Civil Service Code on records matters. Sheriff Margo Frasier testified to the POFG that her department's open records policy did not inhibit her management effectiveness at all, and that in some cases more openness diffused situations when the evidence supported officers' claims.

Last Updated 5/14/00